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Abstract
Linear regression is an important tool across many fields that work with sensitive
human-sourced data. Significant prior work has focused on producing differentially
private point estimates, which provide a privacy guarantee to individuals while still
allowing modelers to draw insights from data by estimating regression coefficients.
We investigate the problem of Bayesian linear regression, with the goal of com-
puting posterior distributions that correctly quantify uncertainty given privately
released statistics. We show that a naive approach that ignores the noise injected
by the privacy mechanism does a poor job in realistic data settings. We then
develop noise-aware methods that perform inference over the privacy mechanism
and produce correct posteriors across a wide range of scenarios.
1 Introduction
Linear regression is one of the most widely used statistical methods, especially in the social sci-
ences [Agresti and Finlay, 2009] and other domains where data comes from humans. It is important
to develop robust tools that can realize the benefits of regression analyses but maintain the privacy
of individuals. Differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2006] is a widely accepted formalism to provide
algorithmic privacy guarantees: a differentially private algorithm randomizes its computation to
provably limit the risk that its output discloses information about individuals.
Existing work on differentially private linear regression focuses on frequentist approaches. A variety
of privacy mechanisms have been applied to point estimation of regression coefficients, including
sufficient statistic perturbation (SSP) [Foulds et al., 2016, McSherry and Mironov, 2009, Vu and
Slavkovic, 2009, Wang, 2018, Zhang et al., 2016], posterior sampling (OPS) [Dimitrakakis et al.,
2014, Geumlek et al., 2017, Minami et al., 2016, Wang, 2018, Wang et al., 2015, Zhang et al., 2016],
subsample and aggregate [Dwork and Smith, 2010, Smith, 2008], objective perturbation [Kifer et al.,
2012], and noisy stochastic gradient descent [Bassily et al., 2014]. Only a few recent works address
uncertainty quantification through confidence interval estimation [Sheffet, 2017] and hypothesis
tests [Barrientos et al., 2019] for regression coefficients.
We develop a differentially private method for Bayesian linear regression. A Bayesian approach
naturally quantifies parameter uncertainty through a full posterior distribution and provides other
Bayesian capabilities such as the ability to incorporate prior knowledge and compute posterior
predictive distributions. Existing approaches to private Bayesian inference include OPS (see above),
MCMC [Wang et al., 2015], variational inference (VI; Honkela et al. [2018], Jälkö et al. [2017],
Park et al. [2016]), and SSP [Bernstein and Sheldon, 2018, Foulds et al., 2016], but none provide
a fully satisfactory approach for Bayesian regression modeling. OPS does not naturally produce a
representation of a full posterior distribution. MCMC approaches incur per-iteration privacy costs
and satisfy only approximate (, δ)-differential privacy. Private VI approaches also incur per-iteration
privacy costs, and are most relevant when the original inference problem requires VI. When applicable,
SSP is a very desirable approach — sufficient statistics are perturbed once and then used in conjugate
updates to obtain parameters of full posterior distributions — and often outperforms other methods in
practice [Foulds et al., 2016, Wang, 2018]. However, Bernstein and Sheldon [2018] demonstrated
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(for unconditional exponential family models) that naive SSP, which ignores noise introduced by the
privacy mechanism, systematically underestimates uncertainty at small to moderate sample sizes. We
show that the same phenomenon holds for Bayesian linear regression: naive SSP produces private
posteriors that are properly calibrated asymptotically in the sample size, but for realistic data sets and
privacy levels may need very large population sizes to reach the asymptotic regime.
This motivates our development of Bayesian inference methods for linear regression that properly
account for the noise due to the privacy mechanism [Bernstein and Sheldon, 2018, Bernstein et al.,
2017, Karwa et al., 2014, 2016, Schein et al., 2018, Williams and McSherry, 2010]. We leverage a
model in which the data and model parameters are latent variables, and noisy sufficient statistics are
observed, and then develop MCMC-based techniques to sample from posterior distributions, as done
for exponential families in [Bernstein and Sheldon, 2018]. A significant challenge relative to prior
work is the handling of covariate data. Typical regression modeling treats only response variables
and parameters as random, and conditions on covariates. This is not possible in the private setting,
where covariates must be kept private and therefore treated as latent variables. We therefore require
some form of assumption about the distribution over covariates. We develop two inference methods.
The first includes latent variables for each individual; it requires an explicit prior distribution for
covariates and its runtime scales with population size. The second marginalizes out individuals and
approximates the distribution over the sufficient statistics; it requires weaker assumptions about
the covariate distribution (only moments), and its running time does not scale with population size.
We perform a range of experiments to measure the calibration and utility of these methods. Our
noise-aware methods are as well or nearly as well calibrated as the non-private method, and have
better utility than the naive method. We demonstrate using real data that our noise-aware methods
quantify posterior predictive uncertainty significantly better than naive SSP.
2 Background
Differential Privacy. A differentially private algorithm A provides a guarantee to individuals: The
distribution over the output of A will be (nearly) indistinguishable regardless of the inclusion or
exclusion of a single individual’s data. The implication to the individual is they face negligible risk in
deciding to contribute their personal data to be used by a differentially private algorithm. To formally
write the guarantee we reason about a generic data set X = x1:n = (x1, · · · , xn) of n individuals,
where xi is the data record of the ith individual. For this paper, define neighboring data sets as those
that differ by a single record, i.e. X ′ ∈ nbrs(X) if X ′ = (x1:i−1, x′i, xi+1:n) for some i. 1
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy; Dwork et al. [2006]). A randomized algorithm A satisfies -
differential privacy if for any input X , any X ′ ∈ nbrs(X) and any subset of outputs O ⊆ Range(A),
Pr[A(X) ∈ O] ≤ exp()Pr[A(X ′) ∈ O].
The above guarantee is ensured by randomizing A. A key concept is the sensitivity of a function,
which quantifies the impact an individual record has on the output of the function.
Definition 2 (Sensitivity; Dwork et al. [2006]). The sensitivity of a function f is ∆f =
supX,X′∈nbrs(X)‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖1.
We use the Laplace mechanism to ensure publicly-released statistics meet the requirements of
differential privacy.
Definition 3 (Laplace Mechanism; Dwork et al. [2006]). Given a function f that maps data sets
to Rm, the Laplace mechanism outputs the random variable L(X) ∼ Lap (f(X),∆f/) from the
Laplace distribution, which has density Lap(z;u, b) = (2b)−m exp (−‖z − u‖1/b). This corre-
sponds to adding zero-mean independent noise ui ∼ Lap(0,∆f/) to each component of f(X).
A final property is post-processing, which says that any further processing on the output of a
differentially private algorithm that does not access the original data retains the same privacy guaran-
tees [Dwork and Roth, 2014].
Linear Regression. We start with a standard (non-private) linear regression problem. An individual’s
covariate or regressor data is x ∈ Rd and the dependent response data is y ∈ R. We will assume a
1This variant is called bounded differential privacy in that the number of individuals n remains constant [Kifer
and Machanavajjhala, 2011].
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conditionally Gaussian model y ∼ N (θTx, σ2), where θ ∈ Rd are the regression coefficients and
σ2 is the error variance. An intercept or bias term may be included in the model by appending a
unit-valued feature to x. The goal, given an observed population of n individuals, is to obtain a point
estimate of θ. The population data can be written asX ∈ Rn×d, where each row corresponds to an in-
dividual x, and y ∈ Rn. The ordinary least squares (OLS) solution is θˆ = (XTX)−1XTy [Rencher,
2003].
In Bayesian linear regression the parameters θ and σ2 are random variables with a specified prior distri-
bution. The conjugate priors are p(σ2) = InverseGamma(a0, b0) and p(θ | σ2) = N (µ0, σ2Λ−10 ),
which defines a normal-inverse gamma prior distribution: p(θ, σ2) = NIG(µ0,Λ0, a0, b0). Due to
conjugacy of the prior distribution with the likelihood model, the posterior distribution, shown in
Equation (1), is also normal-inverse gamma [O’Hagan and Forster, 1994].
p(θ, σ2 | X,y) = NIG(µn,Λn, an, bn) (1)
µn =
(
XTX + Λ0
)−1 (
XTy + µT0 Λ0
)
Λn = X
TX + Λ0
an = a0 +
1
2
n
bn = b0 +
1
2
(
yTy + µT0 Λ0µ0 − µTnΛnµn
)
Let t(x, y) := [vec(xxT ), xy, y2] for an arbitrary individual. Then the sufficient statistics of the
above model are s := t(X,y) =
∑
i t
(
x(i), y(i)
)
=
[
XTX, XTy, yTy
]
. These capture all
information about the model parameters contained in the sample and are the only quantities needed
for the conjugate posterior updates above [Casella and Berger, 2002].
3 Private Bayesian Linear Regression
The goal is to perform Bayesian linear regression in an -differentially private manner. We ensure
privacy by employing sufficient statistic perturbation (SSP) [Foulds et al., 2016, Vu and Slavkovic,
2009, Zhang et al., 2016], in which the Laplace mechanism is used to inject noise into the sufficient
statistics of the model, making them fit for public release. The question is then how to compute the
posterior over the model parameters θ and σ2 given the noisy sufficient statistics. We first consider a
naive method that ignores the noise in the noisy sufficient statistics. We then consider more principled
noise-aware inference approaches that account for the noise due to the privacy mechanism.
3.1 Privacy mechanism
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Figure 1: Private
regression model.
Using the Laplace mechanism to release the noisy sufficient statistics z results
in the model shown in Figure 1. This is the same model used in non-private
linear regression except for the introduction of z, which requires the exact
sufficient statistics s to have finite sensitivity. A standard assumption in
literature [Awan and Slavkovic, 2018, Sheffet, 2017, Wang, 2018, Zhang
et al., 2012] is to assume x and y have known a priori lower and upper
bounds, (ax, bx) and (ay, by), with bound widths wx = bx − ax (assuming,
for simplicity, equal bounds for all covariate dimensions) and wy = by −
ay, respectively. We can then reason about the worst case influence of an
individual on each component of s =
[
XTX,XTy,yTy
]
, recalling that
s =
∑
i t(x
(i), y(i)), so that
[
∆(XTX)jk , ∆(Xy)j , ∆y2
]
=
[
w2x, wxwy, w
2
y
]
.
The number of unique elements2 in s is [d(d+ 1)/2, d, 1], so ∆s = w2xd(d+
1)/2 + wxwyd+ w
2
y. The noisy sufficient statistics fit for public release are
z =
[
zi ∼ Lap(si,∆s/) : si ∈ s
]
.
2Note that XTX is symmetric.
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3.2 Noise-naive method
Previous work developed methods to obtain OLS solutions via SSP by ignoring the noise injected into
the sufficient statistics [Awan and Slavkovic, 2018, Sheffet, 2017, Wang, 2018]. One corresponding
approach for Bayesian regression is to naively replace s in Figure 1 with the noisy version z and then
perform the conjugate update in Equation (1). This noise-naive method (Naive) is simple and fast,
and we empirically show in Section 4 that it produces an asymptotically correct posterior.
3.3 Noise-aware inference
Instead of ignoring the noise introduced by the privacy mechanism, we propose to perform in-
ference over the noise in the model in Figure 1 in order to produce correct posteriors regard-
less of the data size. The biggest change from non-private to private Bayesian linear regression
is that due to privacy constraints we can no longer condition on the covariate data X . The
non-private posterior is p(θ, σ2|X,y) ∝ p(θ, σ2) p(y|X,θ, σ2) while the private posterior is
p(θ, σ2|z) ∝ ∫ p(X)p(θ, σ2) p(y|X,θ, σ2) p(z|X,y) dX dy (see derivations in supplementary ma-
terial). The private posterior contains the term p(X), which means that in order to calculate it we
need to know something about the distribution of X!
Given an explicitly specified prior p(X), we can perform inference over the model in Figure 1
using general-purpose MCMC algorithms. We use the No-U-Turn Sampler [Hoffman and Gelman,
2014] from the PyMC3 package [Salvatier et al., 2016], and call this method noise-aware individual-
based inference (MCMC-Ind). This approach is simple to implement using existing tools but places
a substantial burden on the modeler relative to the non-private case by requiring an explicit prior
distribution p(X), with poor choices potentially leading to incorrect inferences. Additionally, because
MCMC-Ind instantiates latent variables for each individual, its runtime scales with population size and
it may be slow for large populations.
3.4 Sufficient statistics-based inference
An appealing possibility is to marginalize out the variables X and y representing individuals and
instead perform inference directly over the latent sufficient statistics s. The joint distribution is
p(θ, σ2, s, z) = p(θ, σ2) p(s | θ, σ2) p(z | s). The goal is to compute a representation of p(θ, σ2 |
z) ∝ ∫
s
p(θ, σ2, s, z) ds by integrating over the sufficient statistics. Because this distribution cannot
be written in closed form we develop a Gibbs sampler to sample from the posterior as done by
Bernstein and Sheldon [2018] for unconditional exponential family models. This requires methods to
sample from the conditional distributions for both the parameters (θ, σ2) and the sufficient statistics s
given all other variables. The full conditional p(θ, σ2 | s) for the model parameters can be computed
and sampled using conjugacy, exactly as in the non-private case. The full conditional for s factors into
two terms: p(s | θ, σ2, z) ∝ p(s | θ, σ2) p(z | s). The first is the distribution over sufficient statistics
of the regression model, for which we develop an asymptotically correct normal approximation. The
second is the noise model due to the privacy mechanism, for which we use variable augmentation to
ensure it is possible to sample from the full conditional distribution of s.
3.4.1 Normal approximation of s
The conditional distribution over the sufficient statistics given the model parameters is
p(s | θ, σ2) =
∫
t−1(s)
p
(
X,y | θ, σ2) dX dy, t−1(s) := {X,y : t(X,y) = s}.
The integral over t−1(s), all possible populations which have sufficient statistics s, is intractable to
compute. Instead we observe that the components of s =
∑
i t(x
(i), y(i)) are sums over individuals.
Therefore, using the central limit theorem (CLT), we approximate their distribution as p(s | θ, σ2) ≈
N (s;nµt, nΣt), where µt = E[t(x, y)] and Σt = Cov (t(x, y)) are the mean and covariance
of the function t(x, y) on a single individual, This approximation is asymptotically correct, i.e.,
1√
n
(s− nµt) D−→ N (0,Σt) [Bickel and Doksum, 2015]. We write the conditional distribution as
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s | · ∼ N (nµt, nΣt),
µt =
[
E
[
vec(xxT )
]
,E [xy] ,E
[
y2
]]
, (2)
Σt =
 Cov
(
vec(xxT )
)
Cov
(
vec(xxT ),xT y
)
Cov
(
vec(xxT ), y2
)
Cov
(
xy, vec(xxT )
)
Cov (xy) Cov
(
xy, y2
)
Cov
(
y2, vec(xxT )
)
Cov
(
y2,xy
)
Var
(
y2
)
 . (3)
The components of µt and Σt can be written in terms of the model parameters (θ, σ
2) and the
second and fourth non-central moments of x as shown below, where we have defined ηij := E [xixj ],
ηijkl := E [xixjxkxl], and ξij,kl := Cov (xixj , xkxl) = ηijkl − ηijηkl. Full derivations can be
found in the supplementary material. We call this family of methods Gibbs-SS.
E [xiy] =
∑
j
θjηij
E
[
y2
]
= σ2 +
∑
i,j
θiθjηij
Cov (xixj , xky) =
∑
l
θlξij,kl
Cov
(
xixj , y
2) =∑
k,l
θkθlξij,kl
Cov (xiy, xjy) = σ2ηij +
∑
k,l
θkθlξij,kl
Cov
(
xiy, y
2) =∑
j,k,l
θjθkθlξij,kl + 2σ
2
∑
j
θjηij
Var
(
y2
)
= 2σ4 +
∑
i,j,k,l
θiθjθkθlξij,kl
+ 4σ2
∑
i,j
θiθjηij
To use this normal distribution for sampling, we need the parameters (θ, σ2) and the moments ηij ,
ηijkl, and ξij,kl. The current parameter values are available within the sampler, but the modeler must
provide estimates for the moments of x, either using prior knowledge or by (privately) estimating the
moments from the data. We discuss three specific possibilities in Section 3.4.4.
Once again, more modeling assumptions are needed than in the non-private case, where it is possible
to condition on x. Gibbs-SS requires milder assumptions (second and fourth moments), however,
than MCMC-Ind (a full prior distribution).
3.4.2 Variable augmentation for p(z | s)
The above approximation for the distribution over sufficient statistics means the full conditional
distribution involves the product of a normal and a Laplace distribution,
p(s | θ, z) ∝ N (s;nµt, nΣt)
· Lap(z; s,∆s/).
It is unclear how to sample from this distribution directly. A similar situation arises in the Bayesian
Lasso, where it is solved by variable augmentation [Park and Casella, 2008]. Bernstein and Shel-
don [2018] adapted the variable augmentation scheme to private inference in exponential fam-
ily models. We take the same approach here, and represent a Laplace random variable as a
scale mixture of normals. Specifically, l ∼ Lap(u, b) is identically distributed to l ∼ N (u, ω2)
where the variance ω2 ∼ Exp (1/(2b2)) is drawn from the exponential distribution (with density
1/(2b2) exp
(−ω2/(2b2))). We augment separately for each component of the vector z so that
z ∼ N (s,diag(ω2)), where ω2j ∼ Exp (2/(2∆2s)). The augmented full conditional p(s | θ, z, ω) is
a product of two multivariate normal distributions, which is itself a multivariate normal distribution.
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Algorithm 1 Gibbs Sampler
1: Initialize θ, σ2, ω2
2: repeat
3: Calculate µt and Σt via Eqs. (2) and (3)
4: s ∼ NormProduct (nµt, nΣt, z,diag(ω2))
5: θ, σ2 ∼ NIG(θ, σ2;µn,Λn, an, bn) via Eqn. (1)
6: 1/ω2j ∼ InverseGaussian
(

∆s|z−s| ,
2
∆2s
)
for all j
Subroutine NormProduct
1: input: µ1,Σ1,µ2,Σ2
2: Σ3 =
(
Σ−11 + Σ
−1
2
)−1
3: µ3 = Σ3
(
Σ−11 µ1 + Σ
−1
2 µ2
)
4: return: N (µ3,Σ3)
3.4.3 The Gibbs sampler
θ, σ
2 ∼ NIG(θ, σ2;µ0,Λ0, a0, b0)
s ∼ N (nµt, nΣt)
ω
2
j ∼ Exp
(
2
2∆2s
)
for all j
z ∼ N(s, diag(ω2))
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The full generative process is shown to the
right, and the corresponding Gibbs sampler is
shown in Algorithm 1. The update for ω2
follows Park and Casella [2008]; the inverse
Gaussian density is InverseGaussian(w;m, v) =√
v/(2piw3) exp
(−v(w −m)2/(2m2w)). Note
that the resulting s drawn from p(s | µt,Σt, ω2)
may require projection onto the space of valid sufficient statistics. This can be done by observing that
if A = [X,y] then the sufficient statistics are contained in the positive-semidefinite (PSD) matrix
B = ATA. For a randomly drawn s, we project if necessary so the corresponding B matrix is PSD.
3.4.4 Distribution over X
As discussed above, Gibbs-SS requires the second and fourth population moments of x to calculate
µt and Σt. We propose three different options for the modeler to provide these and discuss the
algorithmic considerations for each. Because we include the unit feature in x we can restrict our
attention to the fourth moment E
[
x⊗4
]
, which includes the second moment as a subcomponent.
Private sample moments (Gibbs-SS-Noisy). The first option is to estimate population moments
privately by computing the fourth sample moments from X and privately releasing them via the
Laplace mechanism. The sensitivity of the estimate for ηijkl is w4x, and for d = 2 there are D = 5
unique entries, for a total sensitivity of Dw4x. This approach requires splitting the privacy budget
between the release mechanisms for sufficient statistics and moments, which we do evenly. We do
not perform inference over the noisy sample moments, which may introduce some miscalibration of
uncertainty. Pursuing this additional layer of inference is an interesting avenue for future work.
Moments from generic prior (Gibbs-SS-Prior). A second option is to propose a prior distribution
p(x) and obtain population moments directly from the prior, either through known formulas or from
Monte Carlo estimation. This approach does not access the individual data and does not consume any
privacy budget, but requires proposing a prior distribution and computing the fourth moments of x
(once) for that distribution.
Hierarchical normal prior (Gibbs-SS-Update). A final option is to perform inference over the
data moments by specifying an individual-level prior p(x) and then marginalizing away individuals, as
we did for the regression model sufficient statistics. We propose a hierarchical normal prior, as shown
in Figure 2a, which is more dispersed than a normal distribution and allows the modeler to propose
vague priors, but still permits attainable conditional updates. The data x is normally distributed:
x ∼ N (µx, τ2), with parameters drawn from the normal-inverse Wishart (NIW) conjugate prior
distribution, µx, τ
2 ∼ NIW(µ′0,Λ′0,Ψ′0, ν′0). After marginalizing individuals, the latent quantities
are the sufficient statistics XXT (which includes the sample mean and covariance because of the unit
feature). For fixed parameters (µx, τ
2) the distribution p(x) is multivariate normal, and we calculate
its fourth moments as the fourth derivative (via automatic differentiation) of its moment generating
function.
However, we introduced the new latent variables µx and τ
2 into the full model (see Figure 2a) and
must now derive conditional updates for them within the Gibbs sampler. Naively marginalizing X
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Figure 2: (a) Private Bayesian linear regression model with hierarchical normal data prior. (b)
Alternative data model configuration and (c) with individual variables marginalized out.
and y from the full model in Figure 2a would cause both (µx, τ
2) and (θ, σ2) to be parents of s
and thus not conditionally independent given s—this would require their updates to be coupled and
we could no longer use simple conjugacy formulas for each component of the model. To avoid this
issue, we reformulate the joint distribution represented as in Figure 2b. The justification for this is as
follows. Because XTX is a sufficient statistic for p(X) under a normal model, we can encode the
generative process either as (µx, τ
2)→ X → XTX or as (µx, τ2)→ XTX → X . In general, the
latter formulation would require an arrow from (µx, τ
2) to X; this drops precisely because XTX
is a sufficient statistic [Casella and Berger, 2002]. Then, upon marginalizing X and y, we obtain
the model in Figure 2c. The two sets of parameters are now conditionally independent given the
sufficient statistics s, and can be updated independently as standard conjugate updates.
4 Experiments
We design experiments to measure the calibration and utility of the private methods. Calibration
measures how close the computed posterior is to p(θ, σ2|z), the correct posterior given noisy statistics.
Utility measures how close the computed posterior is to the non-private posterior p(θ, σ2|s).
4.1 Methods
The noise-aware individual-based method (MCMC-Ind) is implemented using PyMC3 [Salvatier et al.,
2016]; it runs with 500 burnin iterations and collects 2000 posterior samples. The three flavors of
noise-aware sufficient statistic-based methods use noisy sample moments (Gibbs-SS-Noisy), use
moments sampled from a data prior (Gibbs-SS-Prior), and use an updated hierarchical normal
prior (Gibbs-SS-Update); all three collect 20000 posterior samples after 5000 and 20000 burnin
iterations for n ∈ [10, 100] and n = 1000, respectively. We compare against the baseline noise-naive
method (Naive) and the non-private posterior (Non-Private); both collect 2000 posterior samples.
4.2 Evaluation on synthetic data
Evaluation measures. We adapt a method of Cook et al. [2006] to measure calibration. Consider
a model p(β,w) = p(β)p(w|β). If (β′,w′) ∼ p(β,w), then, for any j, the quantile of β′j in the
true posterior p(βj |w′) is a uniform random variable. We can check our approximate posterior pˆ
by computing the quantile uj of β′j in pˆ(βj |w′) and testing for uniformity of uj over M trials. We
test for uniformity using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) goodness-of-fit test [Massey Jr., 1951]. The
KS-statistic is the maximum distance between the empirical CDF of uj and the uniform CDF; lower
values are better and zero corresponds to perfect uniformity, meaning pˆ is exact.
While this test is elegant, it requires that parameters and data are drawn from the model used
by the method. We use θ, σ2 ∼ NIG
(
[0, 0], diag
([
.5
20−1 ,
.5
20−1
])
, 20, .5
)
. In addition, for
Gibbs-SS-Prior and Gibbs-SS-Update, the test requires the covariate data be drawn from the
data prior used by the methods. We specify µx, τ
2 ∼ NIW(0, 1, 1, 50) and x ∼ N (µx, τ2). These
ensure at least 95% of x and y values are within [−1, 1]. We compute sensitivity assuming data
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bounded in this range, but do not enforce it to avoid changing the generative process (a limitation
of the evaluation method, not the inference routine). For each combination of n and  we run
M = 300 trials. We qualitatively assess calibration with the empirical CDFs, which is also the
quantile-quantile (QQ) plot between the empirical distribution of uj and the uniform distribution. A
diagonal line indicates thats uj is perfectly uniform.
Between two calibrated posteriors, the tighter posterior will provide higher utility.3 We evaluate
utility as closeness to the non-private posterior, which we measure with maximum mean discrep-
ancy (MMD), a kernel-based statistical test to determine if two sets of samples are drawn from
different distributions [Gretton et al., 2012]. Given m i.i.d. samples (p, q) ∼ P ×Q, an unbiased
estimate of the MMD is
MMD2(P,Q) =
1
m(m− 1)
∑m
i6=j (k(pi, pj) + k(qi, qj)− k(pi, qj)− k(pj , qi)) ,
where k is a continuous kernel function; we use a standard normal kernel. The higher the value the
more likely the two samples are drawn from different distributions, therefore lower MMD between
Non-Private and the method indicates higher utility.
We measure method runtime as the average process time over the 300 trials. Note that PyMC3
provides parallelization; we report total process time across all chains for MCMC-Ind.
Results. Calibration results are shown in Figures 3a and 3b. The QQ plot for n = 10 and  = 0.1
is shown in Figure 3c. Coverage results for 95% credible intervals are shown in Figure 3d. All
four noise-aware methods are at or near the calibration-level of the non-private method, and better
than Naive’s calibration, regardless of data size. As expected, Gibbs-SS-Noisy suffers slight
miscalibration from not accounting for the noise injected into the privately released fourth data
moment. There is slight miscalibration in certain settings and parameters for Gibbs-SS-Prior due
to approximations in the calculation of multivariate normal distribution fourth moments from a data
prior. Utility results are shown in Figure 3e; the noise-aware methods provide at least as good utility
as Naive.
Running time. Figure 3f shows running time as a function of population size. We see that MCMC-Ind
scales with increasing population size, and in fact is prohibitive to run at sizes significantly larger
than n = 100, while all variants of Gibbs-SS are constant with respect to population size. It is
also possible to analytically derive the asymptotic running time with respect to covariate dimension
d. The most expensive operation used by Gibbs-SS will be the inversion of the covariance matrix
(defined in Equation 3) in the NormProduct subroutine on Line 4 of Algorithm 1. This matrix has
dimension (d2 + d+ 1)× (d2 + d+ 1), where d2 + d+ 1 are the total number of components in
t(x, y) = [xxT ,xy, y2]. Cubic matrix inversion would cost O((d2 + d + 1)3) = O(d6). Modern
computing platforms can reasonably invert matrices of size 10K or more, corresponding to linear
regression with d ≈ 100 features.
4.3 Predictive posteriors on real data
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1.0
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ε
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Naive
Non-Private
target coverage
Figure 4: Coverage for predictive posterior 50%
and 90% credible intervals.
We evaluate the predictive posteriors of the
methods on a real world data set measuring
the effect of drinking rate on cirrhosis rate.4
We scale both covariate and response data to
[0, 1].5 There are 46 total points, which we
randomly split into 36 training examples and
10 test points for each trial. After prelimi-
nary exploration to gain domain knowledge,
we set a reasonable model prior of θ, σ2 ∼
NIG
(
[1, 0], diag([.25, .25]), 20, .5
)
. We draw
samples θ(k), σ2k from the posterior given train-
ing data, and then form the posterior predictive distribution for each test point yi from these samples.
3Note that the prior itself is a calibrated distribution.
4http://people.sc.fsu.edu/~jburkardt/datasets/regression/x20.txt
5This step is not differentially private, but is standard in existing work. A reasonable assumption is that data
bounds are a priori available due to domain knowledge.
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Figure 3: Synthetic data results: (a) calibration vs. n for  = 0.1; (b) calibration vs.  for n = 10;
(c) QQ plot for n = 10 and  = 0.1; (d) 95% credible interval coverage; (e) MMD of methods to
non-private posterior; (f) method runtimes for  = 0.1.
Figure 4 shows coverage of 50% and 90% credible intervals on 1000 test points collected over 100
random train-test splits. Non-Private achieves nearly correct coverage, with the discrepancy due
to the fact that the data is not actually drawn from the prior. Gibbs-SS-Noisy achieves nearly
the coverage of Non-Private, while Naive is drastically worse in this regime. We note that this
experiment emphasizes the advantage of Gibbs-SS-Noisy not needing an explicitly defined data
prior, as it only requires the same parameter prior that is needed in non-private analysis.
5 Conclusion
In this work we developed methods to perform Bayesian linear regression in a differentially private
way. Our algorithms use sufficient-statistic perturbation as a release mechanism, followed by specially-
designed Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques to sample from the posterior distribution given noisy
sufficient statistics. Unlike in the non-private case, we cannot condition on covariates, so some
assumptions about the covariate distribution are required. We proposed methods that require only
moments of this distribution, and evaluated several ways to obtain the needed moments within the
sampling routine.
Our algorithms are the first specifically designed for the task of Bayesian linear regression, and the
first to properly account for the noise mechanism during inference. Our inferred posterior distributions
are well calibrated, and are better in terms of both calibration and utility than naive SSP, which is
considered a state-of-the-art baseline.
Our evaluation focused on calibration and utility of the posterior. Future work could evaluate the
quality of point estimates obtained as a byproduct of our fully Bayesian algorithms. We expect such
point estimates to be as good as or better than those of naive SSP, which is state-of-the-art for private
linear regression [Wang, 2018]. Compared with prior work using naive SSP for linear regression,
our methods are Bayesian, and perform inference over the noise mechanism. Being Bayesian is not
expected to hurt point estimation. Inference over the noise mechanism is expected to not hurt, and
potentially improve, point estimation.
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Figure 5: (a) Non-private and (b) private regression models.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of non-private and private posteriors in Section 3.3
See corresponding models in Figure 5.
p(θ, σ2 | X,y) = p(θ, σ
2, X,y)
p(X,y)
=
p(X)p(θ, σ2)p(y|X,θ, σ2)
p(X)p(y | X)
=
p(θ, σ2)p(y|X,θ, σ2)
p(y | X)
=
p(θ, σ2)p(y|X,θ, σ2)∫
p(y,θ, σ2 | X) dθ, σ2
=
p(θ, σ2)p(y|X,θ, σ2)∫
p(θ, σ2)p(y | X,θ, σ2) dθ, σ2
p(θ, σ2 | z) =
∫
p(X,y,θ, σ2, z) dX dy
=
∫
p(X,y,θ, σ2)p(z | X,y,θ, σ2)
p(z)
dX dy
= p(z)
∫
p(X,y,θ, σ2)p(z | X,y,θ, σ2) dX dy
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A.2 Gibbs Sufficient Statistic Update
A.2.1 Derivations of Equation (2): Components of µt
E [xiy] = Ex
[
xiEy|x [y]
]
= Ex
[
xiθ
Tx
]
= Ex
xi∑
j
θjxj

=
∑
j
θjE [xixj ]
E
[
y2
]
= Ex
[
Ey|x
[
y2
]]
= Ex
[
σ2 +
(
θTx
)2]
= σ2 + E
(∑
i
θixi
)2
= σ2 + E
∑
i,j
θiθjxixj

= σ2 +
∑
i,j
θiθjE [xixj ]
A.2.2 Derivations of Equation (3): Components of Σt
Cov (xixj , xky) = E [xixjxky]− E [xixj ]E [xky]
= Ex
[
xixjxkEy|x [y]
]− E [xixj ]E [xky]
= Ex
[
xixjxk
∑
l
θlxl
]
− E [xixj ]
∑
l
θlE [xkxl]
=
∑
l
θlE [xixjxkxl]−
∑
l
θlE [xixj ]E [xkxl]
=
∑
l
θl Cov (xixj , xkxl)
Cov
(
xixj , y
2
)
= E
[
xixjy
2
]− E [xixj ]E [y2]
= Ex
[
xixjEy|x
[
y2
]]− E [xixj ]E [y2]
= Ex
xixj
σ2 +∑
k,l
θkθlxkxl
− E [xixj ]
σ2 +∑
k,l
θkθlE [xkxl]

= σ2E [xixj ] +
∑
k,l
θkθlE [xixjxkxl]− σ2E [xixj ]−
∑
k,l
θkθlE [xixj ]E [xkxl]
=
∑
k,l
θkθl Cov (xixj , xkxl)
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Cov (xiy, xjy) = E
[
xixjy
2
]− E [xiy]E [xjy]
= Ex
[
xixjEy|x
[
y2
]]−(∑
k
θkE [xixk]
)(∑
l
θlE [xjxl]
)
= E
xixj
σ2 +∑
k,l
θkθlxkxl
−∑
k,l
θkθlE [xixk]E [xjxl]
= σ2E [xixj ] +
∑
k,l
θkθl (E [xixjxkxl]− E [xixk]E [xjxl])
= σ2E [xixj ] +
∑
k,l
θkθl Cov (xixk, xjxl)
Cov
(
xiy, y
2
)
= E
[
xiy
3
]− E [xiy]E [y2]
= Ex
[
xiEy|x
[
y3
]]− E [xiy]E [y2]
= Ex
xi
∑
j,k,l
θjθkθlxjxkxl + 3σ
2
∑
j
θjxj

−
∑
j
θjE [xixj ]
σ2 +∑
k,l
θkθlxkxl

=
∑
j,k,l
θjθkθlE [xixjxkxl] + 3σ2
∑
j
θjE [xixj ]
− σ2
∑
j
θjE [xixj ] +
∑
j,k,l
θjθkθlE [xixj ]E [xkxl]
=
∑
j,k,l
θjθkθl Cov (xixj , xkxl) + 2σ2
∑
j
θjE [xixj ]
Var
(
y2
)
= E
[
y4
]− E [y2]2
= 3σ4 +
∑
j,k,l,m
θjθkθlθmE [xjxkxlxm] + 6σ2
∑
j,k
θjθkE [xjxk]−
σ2 +∑
j,k
θjθkE [xjxk]
2
= 3σ4 +
∑
j,k,l,m
θjθkθlθmE [xjxkxlxm] + 6σ2
∑
j,k
θjθkE [xjxk]
− σ4 − 2σ2
∑
j,k
θjθkE [xjxk]−
∑
j,k,l,m
θjθkθlθmE [xjxk]E [xlxm]
= 2σ4 +
∑
j,k,l,m
θjθkθlθm (E [xjxkxlxm]− E [xjxk]E [xlxm]) + 4σ2
∑
j,k
θjθkE [xjxk]
= 2σ4 +
∑
j,k,l,m
θjθkθlθm Cov (xjxk, xlxm) + 4σ2
∑
j,k
θjθkE [xjxk]
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